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🔥 Happy birthday armored symbol and 4 bars consulting
explained
He was A year ago When I started Armoredcode.com project.
The goal, it is useful to remember this, is to talk to the developers about the safety of the application. This evening there are three new security consultations for
Ruby on Rails MVC.
Are the bars under the attack?
yesterday, Tenderlove I mentioned 4 new security consultations for Ruby on bars. Two of them are consulting about crossed cinematic weaknesses that affect the sterilization of assistants, and therefore it is important to the upgrade place to the latest version of Rails.
- Cve 2013-1855
Weak xss in Sanitize_CSS in the work package - Cve 2013-1857
Weak xss insanitizeRuby assistant on bars
Tenderlove also gave some Monkey correction to apply it if you cannot correct your Rails installation.
“ Rubytenderlove Monkey Patch for Cve 2013-1855 Module HTML Class Whitelistanitizer # sterilizing a block of CSS icon. Used by #sanitize when it encounters the feature of Def Sanitize_CSS (Disallow URLS Style = style.to_s.gsub (/url \ s(\ s(^\ s))+? \ s) \ s/, ‘)
# gauntlet
if style !~ /\A((:,;#%.\sa-zA-Z0-9!)|\w-\w|\'(\s\w)+\'|\"(\s\w)+\"|\((\d,\s)+\))*\z/ ||
style !~ /\A(\s*(-\w)+\s*:\s*(^:;)*(;|$)\s*)*\z/
return ''
end
clean = ()
style.scan(/((-\w)+)\s*:\s*((^:;)*)/) do |prop,val|
if allowed_css_properties.include?(prop.downcase)
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
elsif shorthand_css_properties.include?(prop.split('-')(0).downcase)
unless val.split().any? do |keyword|
!allowed_css_keywords.include?(keyword) &&
keyword !~ /\A(#(0-9a-f)+|rgb\(\d+%?,\d*%?,?\d*%?\)?|\d🔗\.?\dFull Article(cm|em|ex|in|mm|pc|pt|px|%|,|\))?)\z/
end
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
end
end
end
clean.join(' ')
end end end ```
“ roubytenderlove symbol to put it in a composition file /its preparation to repair CVE-2013-1857 HTML Class Whitelistanitizer Self.protocol_Separator = /: | (58) | (P) | (3A) | ( % | %) 3A/i
def contains_bad_protocols?(attr_name, value)
uri_attributes.include?(attr_name) &&
(value =~ /(^(^\/:)*):|(*58)|(p)|(*3a)|(%|%)3A/i && !allowed_protocols.include?(value.split(protocol_separator).first.downcase.strip))
end
end end ```
It is true that you are told, I see that the large number of security problems of the railways as symptoms acquired by the framework in popularity.
The site’s textual programming threat
It is one of the vast security weaknesses that affect web applications these days. to Owasp Project It is one of the most prevalent security risks for institutions, in 2010, was the second element in the first ten places, and in 2013 it will be the third place in these security risks.
He loses a place but is far from mitigation.
The idea behind the script of the cross -site is easy. The web application is weak if it takes an insertion (either from a web or from the HTTP request) and uses it without verifying health or escaping.
There are three different types of site programming attacks (AKA XSS):
- Reflected
- storage
- On the basis of
The reflection of the site programming program for the site
Crossed scrutiny is reflected when the web application consumes the user’s insertion using it in one of its pages. The common scenario is the search results page when the search key is echoed to summon the user about his choice.
Follow there a Senatra Web app that takes a teacher from the URL and is used in the offer to say hello to the user. Of course this app is far from being something to be used in production but can be used to exploit the reflected XSS.
The “Ruby” application requires the weak “Sinatra” application.
Get ‘/’ do @NAME = Params (: Name) Erb: End
end
@@index
Welcome <Ùª = name Ùª>
Using with a regular string, this is the output we expect.
!()(https://armoredcode.com/images/reflected_xss_notaint.png)
Since we **trust user inputs** (and this is a typical habit in software
development) if the name parameter is filled with this piece of js
<script>alert('xss')</script>
then the resulting HTML will be
``` html resulting body snippet
Hello
The browser does not know that he should receive a user’s name with a hello message. It takes this piece of HTML and makes it the following result:
In order to understand how dangerous it can be crossed text programming, see this scenario:
- Web site is vulnerable
- The attacker designs a well -made cruciferous email that takes advantage of XSS in the email link
- The attack pattern is to redirect to an attacking tight site with a web page that reads all cookies
- The user is redirected to the weak website
`Javascript Jet_Cookies_ARRAY () Source “
Text programming for the stored site
The stored cross programming occurs when the weak web application stores the user’s entry into a database or file for additional use.
In the previous web applications test, with the source code review, I found this:
- The web application displays a user comments page with HTML Textarea element
- The web application saves users’ notes in the database without liquidating or clearing them
- Read the interior web app, database for Datamin activities
It was possible, as fake comments, a text programming pattern attack across the site that is eventually stored in the database. When the second web app (exposed to the Internet) reads that the database that tries to create a table with user notes is used and the attack is used.
This is a program stored for the site in short.
Textual programming of the crossing site in DOM
The DOM -based XSS attack occurs when the attack load is carried out by modifying the DOM document in the victim browser using an attacking side of the attack pattern.
The most richer user interfaces are performed by the mission customer, using parameters to create models, mask or filling values ​​without passing such parameters to the application server. This is done to save some traffic requests and achieve better performance.
If DOM is updated without liquidating the values ​​that the user reads, it is possible to inject the arbitrary javascript code that will be implemented on the customer side. Keep in mind that due to the non -transfer of a symbol to the server, it is unlikely to provide you with the web application protection wall of this type of attack.
Happy Birthday Archodcode.com
In this first year of blogging:
- 24.701 visited people This site Fredon visitors
- 74.74 % of visitors were people speaking English. Use only 2.85 % their browser with the Italian language
- USA with 26.37 % of visits is the country that loves more armored / followed by Italy (10.04 %).
- Few visiters use Internet Explorer (4.11 %) but we have a lot of Windows visitors from there (44.93 %
You all … Thank you very much
Via Read more at: 🚀
uncovered #Happy #birthday #armored #symbol #bars #consulting
🔗 Paolo Perego on 2013-03-18 23:15:00
Read Now armoredcode.com – the application security blog that gets the job done
Tags: Happy birthday armored symbol and 4 bars consulting
📰 Published by
He was A year ago When I started Armoredcode.com project.
The goal, it is useful to remember this, is to talk to the developers about the safety of the application. This evening there are three new security consultations for
Ruby on Rails MVC.
Are the bars under the attack?
yesterday, Tenderlove I mentioned 4 new security consultations for Ruby on bars. Two of them are consulting about crossed cinematic weaknesses that affect the sterilization of assistants, and therefore it is important to the upgrade place to the latest version of Rails.
- Cve 2013-1855
Weak xss in Sanitize_CSS in the work package - Cve 2013-1857
Weak xss insanitizeRuby assistant on bars
Tenderlove also gave some Monkey correction to apply it if you cannot correct your Rails installation.
“ Rubytenderlove Monkey Patch for Cve 2013-1855 Module HTML Class Whitelistanitizer # sterilizing a block of CSS icon. Used by #sanitize when it encounters the feature of Def Sanitize_CSS (Disallow URLS Style = style.to_s.gsub (/url \ s(\ s(^\ s))+? \ s) \ s/, ‘)
# gauntlet
if style !~ /\A((:,;#%.\sa-zA-Z0-9!)|\w-\w|\'(\s\w)+\'|\"(\s\w)+\"|\((\d,\s)+\))*\z/ ||
style !~ /\A(\s*(-\w)+\s*:\s*(^:;)*(;|$)\s*)*\z/
return ''
end
clean = ()
style.scan(/((-\w)+)\s*:\s*((^:;)*)/) do |prop,val|
if allowed_css_properties.include?(prop.downcase)
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
elsif shorthand_css_properties.include?(prop.split('-')(0).downcase)
unless val.split().any? do |keyword|
!allowed_css_keywords.include?(keyword) &&
keyword !~ /\A(#(0-9a-f)+|rgb\(\d+%?,\d*%?,?\d*%?\)?|\dSource Feed:\.?\dFull Article(cm|em|ex|in|mm|pc|pt|px|%|,|\))?)\z/
end
clean << prop + ': ' + val + ';'
end
end
end
clean.join(' ')
end end end ```
“ roubytenderlove symbol to put it in a composition file /its preparation to repair CVE-2013-1857 HTML Class Whitelistanitizer Self.protocol_Separator = /: | (58) | (P) | (3A) | ( % | %) 3A/i
def contains_bad_protocols?(attr_name, value)
uri_attributes.include?(attr_name) &&
(value =~ /(^(^\/:)*):|(*58)|(p)|(*3a)|(%|%)3A/i && !allowed_protocols.include?(value.split(protocol_separator).first.downcase.strip))
end
end end ```
It is true that you are told, I see that the large number of security problems of the railways as symptoms acquired by the framework in popularity.
The site’s textual programming threat
It is one of the vast security weaknesses that affect web applications these days. to Owasp Project It is one of the most prevalent security risks for institutions, in 2010, was the second element in the first ten places, and in 2013 it will be the third place in these security risks.
He loses a place but is far from mitigation.
The idea behind the script of the cross -site is easy. The web application is weak if it takes an insertion (either from a web or from the HTTP request) and uses it without verifying health or escaping.
There are three different types of site programming attacks (AKA XSS):
- Reflected
- storage
- On the basis of
The reflection of the site programming program for the site
Crossed scrutiny is reflected when the web application consumes the user’s insertion using it in one of its pages. The common scenario is the search results page when the search key is echoed to summon the user about his choice.
Follow there a Senatra Web app that takes a teacher from the URL and is used in the offer to say hello to the user. Of course this app is far from being something to be used in production but can be used to exploit the reflected XSS.
The “Ruby” application requires the weak “Sinatra” application.
Get ‘/’ do @NAME = Params (: Name) Erb: End
end
@@index
Welcome <Ùª = name Ùª>
Using with a regular string, this is the output we expect.
!()(https://armoredcode.com/images/reflected_xss_notaint.png)
Since we **trust user inputs** (and this is a typical habit in software
development) if the name parameter is filled with this piece of js
<script>alert('xss')</script>
then the resulting HTML will be
``` html resulting body snippet
Hello
The browser does not know that he should receive a user’s name with a hello message. It takes this piece of HTML and makes it the following result:
In order to understand how dangerous it can be crossed text programming, see this scenario:
- Web site is vulnerable
- The attacker designs a well -made cruciferous email that takes advantage of XSS in the email link
- The attack pattern is to redirect to an attacking tight site with a web page that reads all cookies
- The user is redirected to the weak website
`Javascript Jet_Cookies_ARRAY () Written by “
Text programming for the stored site
The stored cross programming occurs when the weak web application stores the user’s entry into a database or file for additional use.
In the previous web applications test, with the source code review, I found this:
- The web application displays a user comments page with HTML Textarea element
- The web application saves users’ notes in the database without liquidating or clearing them
- Read the interior web app, database for Datamin activities
It was possible, as fake comments, a text programming pattern attack across the site that is eventually stored in the database. When the second web app (exposed to the Internet) reads that the database that tries to create a table with user notes is used and the attack is used.
This is a program stored for the site in short.
Textual programming of the crossing site in DOM
The DOM -based XSS attack occurs when the attack load is carried out by modifying the DOM document in the victim browser using an attacking side of the attack pattern.
The most richer user interfaces are performed by the mission customer, using parameters to create models, mask or filling values ​​without passing such parameters to the application server. This is done to save some traffic requests and achieve better performance.
If DOM is updated without liquidating the values ​​that the user reads, it is possible to inject the arbitrary javascript code that will be implemented on the customer side. Keep in mind that due to the non -transfer of a symbol to the server, it is unlikely to provide you with the web application protection wall of this type of attack.
Happy Birthday Archodcode.com
In this first year of blogging:
- 24.701 visited people This site Fredon visitors
- 74.74 % of visitors were people speaking English. Use only 2.85 % their browser with the Italian language
- USA with 26.37 % of visits is the country that loves more armored / followed by Italy (10.04 %).
- Few visiters use Internet Explorer (4.11 %) but we have a lot of Windows visitors from there (44.93 %
You all … Thank you very much
Source Feed: Read more at: Authored by
Via #Happy #birthday #armored #symbol #bars #consulting
Via Paolo Perego on 2013-03-18 23:15:00
{Source Feed:|From:|Via} armoredcode.com – the application security blog that gets the job done
